In order to faithfully report the different stages of the 'EEA-Drama', I shall start by exposing the antecedents, negotiating history and content of the Draft EEA Agreement as it stood when first submitted to the ECJ (I); after this, the three most important issues raised by the Court's ruling in Opinion 1/91 shall be presented by summarizing the Court's appreciation (II.A), then analyzing its scope and possible meaning (II.B) (II); I will then describe the main aspects of the Agreement's renegotiated version (III) and proceed, as above, to a summary and analysis of the three major topics which, in Opinion 1/92, restate, modulate or develop the Court's initial evaluation (IV).
This analysis should permit conclusions concerning the constitutional significance of these Opinions. First, the Court may have construed the Community's objectives as creating an obligation of attaining European Union, but this will not prevent the EEA's realization; second, the Court found a practicable solution combining the institution of international tribunals by Agreements concluded by the Community and its Member States with the preservation of the autonomy of the Community legal order; third, the Court practically completed its prior work of reducing the distinctions between 'communautaire' and 'mixed' agreements and modified the doctrine of 'implied powers' in order to permit the delegation of implementing powers to Community institutions, by way of international agreements, in areas exceeding the Community's material jurisdiction. In some of these fields, there may be indications of the emergence of 'higher', foundational norms of primary Community law (V).
I. Prologue -The History of the EEA 5
The Contracting Parties' economic relations had been governed since 1972-73, the date of the Community's first enlargement, by Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) between the Community and the individual EFTA countries. In April 1984, at a ministerial meeting convened in order to celebrate the FTAs' final implementation, the Ministers and Community Representatives issued the 'Luxembourg Declaration' 6 in which they stressed the importance of strengthening cooperation and ultimately creating a 'dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Space'. 7 Although this expression was never clearly defined, its underlying idea was to parallel the EC's completion of the Single Market, from which the EFTA countries feared imminent exclusion, by providing, in the form of a single agreement concluded between both trading blocs, a comprehensive material and institutional framework exceeding the FTAs. The years following the Luxembourg Declaration, successful in various forms of informal cooperation, did not bring the EES into realization. The decisive signal came in January 1989, when Commission President Delors presented the idea of creating a 'more structured partnership with common decision-making and administrative institutions...' 8 The EFTA countries' response being positive, formal negotiations began in June 1990.
The undertaking proved to be complex. At stake was the creation of an area in which the four freedoms and the rules of competition of the EC Internal Market in industrial goods, restricted reciprocal market access for agricultural and fisheries products, structured cooperation in areas such as environment and consumer protection, education and research activities and economic and social policies, as well as joint action regarding economic cohesion would, in the form of a traditional intergovernmental agreement, be uniformly applicable within twenty legal orders. Eventually, a compromise balancing all interests 9 was reached.
The objective of the whole undertaking was [t] o establish a dynamic and homogeneous European Economic Area, based on common rules and equal conditions of competition ... and achieved on the basis of equality and reciprocity and of an overall balance of benefits, rights and obligations... 10 This was seen as necessary in order to achieve [a] continuous and balanced strengthening of trade and economic relations ... with equal conditions of competition and the respect of the same rules, with a view to creating a homogeneous European Economic Area... 11 Following the 'two pillars approach' advocated by the Commission, the EEA 'superstructure' would be composed of two joint organs: an EEA Council endowed with the definition of the general orientations and provision of the political impulse necessary for the EEA's implementation, and an EEA Joint Committee responsible for its supervision, as well as for the first stage of dispute settlement between the parties. 12 Within the 'pillars', EFTA would have to duplicate the EC institutional organization, an EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) paralleling, to the extent necessary, the EC Commission's tasks. 13 The Draft EEA's ultima vox for the settlement of disputes between the Parties and the control of the EFTA surveillance mechanism was an EEA Court, independent though functionally integrated with the ECJ and competent to deliver binding decisions concerning the interpretation and application of the Agreement, including its Annexes and Protocols. 14 This EEA Court was not the Agreement's only court: Additionally, EFTA countries' national courts could be given an opportunity to 'ask' the ECJ to 'express itself' on questions concerning the interpretation of EEA provisions, 15 which are '[i]dentical in substance to the provisions of the [EC] Treaties...' 16 'Extent' and 'modalities' of the procedure's application were left to the discretion of EFTA countries' .
The international duplication of EC rules envisaged by the EEA, combined with the setting-up of an independent judicial mechanism, was bound to raise fundamental questions about the Agreement's compatibility with Community law, difficulties which could only be aggravated by the EEA's 'mixity', i.e. the fact that this Association Agreement was to be concluded by the Community in conjunction with its Member States. The 'mixity-issue' was however not raised, 17 Recital 1. In its analysis of the EEA's objectives, the ECJ seems not to have attributed too much weight to this self-imposed restraint. An analysis of its dicta in Opinion 1/91 concerning the position of international agreements in the Community legal order, and of the European Parliament's legal objections in Opinion 1/92 raises the question whether, at the least as a matter of judicial policy, the Court should ever accept any such restraint. 21
Especially the decision-making process and, in competition matters, the separation of tasks between Commission and ESA, ibid. This was a warning-signal in the Commission's direction (see infra part III.).
22
Opinion 1/91, at 51. A complete examination of all aspects of the Court's ruling would exceed the scope of this paper. It would also have to focus on the Court's reading of the Draft EEA's dispositions in a more extended way than is possible here. I will therefore concentrate on the ECJ's three main contributions, in my view, to the Community legal order, and propose alternative readings of the Draft EEA only insofar as this seems essential for the understanding of my argument.
the EC Treaties could not necessarily mean their identical interpretation. 23 The EEA being an international agreement, it had to be interpreted, according to Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to its wording and in the light of its object and purpose. Having initially defined the EEA's main objective as the attainment of 'legal homogeneity', 24 the Court later declared that the EEA's goals were free trade and competition in the economic and commercial relations between the Contracting Parties. 25 Though present in the Community as well, these were however not its ultimate goals:
It follows inter alia from Arts. 2, 8A and 102A of the EEC Treaty that this Treaty aims to achieve economic integration leading to the establishment of an Internal Market and Economic and Monetary Union. In addition, Art. 1 of the Single European Act makes it clear moreover that the objective of all the Community Treaties is to contribute together to making concrete progress towards European Unity. 26 The Court restates and develops this Leitmotiv of its ruling in the context of its analysis of the EEA Court, the EC's tasks being defined as [t] An a priori denial of direct effects to the future EEA seems however not to have been the ECJ's goal. 37 Nor did it conclude that the EEA provisions need necessarily be interpreted in a different way than the corresponding EEC provisions. 38 The Court, apparently evaluating the EEA's objectives, was in reality about to redefine the Community's finality.
In Polydor, the Court had been asked whether parts of its (prior) jurisprudence regarding Articles 30 and 36 EEC could be applied to an FTA's almost identical provisions. Having established that these provisions were indeed 'in several aspects similar' 39 to those of the EEC Treaty, the ECJ concluded that this 'similarity of terms' 40 was not a sufficient reason for its case-law's transposition:
The scope of that case-law must indeed be determined in the light of the Community's objectives and activities as defined by Articles 2 and 3 of the EEC Treaty. ... [This] Treaty, by establishing a common market and progressively approximating the economic policies of the Member States, seeks to unite national markets into a single market having the characteristics of a domestic market. 41 The Polydor reasoning would not have sufficed to show the differences in objective between the Community and the EEA. The Community's objectives under Polydor being only economical in nature, and the EEA actually disposing of (at least some) instruments for a certain uniformity of application of the EEA's provisions, these rules should have been perfectly suited for analogous interpretation. But the Court's main interests in this part of the opinion are not the EEA's objectives. A paradigm-shift has taken place.
The first, and least, lies in the economic field -here, the Internal Market, introduced by Article 8A, has replaced the Common Market, and Article 102A has laid the foundations for Economic and Monetary Union. 42 The second, and possibly Turkey, see infra note 94. 36
Polydor, supra note 23, concerned the FTA with Portugal, which also gave rise to the Court's ruling in Kupferberg, ibid., see also infra C.2. 37
Some recitals could be understood in this sense, notably recitals 20 and 49, which insist on the fact that, despite Art. 6 EEA and Draft Protocol 35 (supra notes 31-32), the EEA 'in substance' only creates rights and obligations between the CPs as opposed to the supremacy and direct effects characteristic of the Community legal order. 38
Polydor and Kupferberg read together suggest that certain of the FTA's dispositions are capable of creating direct effects, at the price of a more restrictive interpretation than their EEC counterparts. 39
Polydor, supra note 23, recital 14. 40
Ibid., recital 15. 41
Ibid., recital 16. This distinction was all the more necessary since the Community disposed of legal instruments capable of achieving the uniform application of Community law and the progressive abolition of legislative disparities within the Common Market, which had no equivalent inside the FTA (recital 20). 42
Both provisions were introduced into the EEC Treaty by the SEA. Whether the Court here finally answered the question of differences in scope between 'Common Market' and 'Single Market' in favour of the latter, seems of minor importance. More important is that the Court seems to have taken account of the fact that Art. 102A EEC had been implemented by the Treaty for the Creation far-reaching, lies in the political sphere. Here, the Court has, for the first time, addressed a new Community objective, the making of concrete progress towards European Union 43 as expressed in Article 1 SEA. 44 As the language versions of both the SEA's Preamble and Article 1 and the Court's Opinion diverge, the scope of this passage depends on the version retained. The Opinion's French version could be read in the following way. The Court interpreted the SEA's Preamble and Article 1, although Article 31 SEA in principle excludes both provisions from the scope of its interpretative jurisdiction, 45 in the sense that both had identical goals, namely the attainment of European Union. 46 As the Court moreover read the joint nature of this political objective out of Article 1 SEA 47 and seems to have understood it as creating an enforcing obligation for itself, 48 all future Community action might have to contribute to making concrete progress towards European Union. 49 The Opinion's English version is more mundane. The Court simply quotes the Community's objectives as they are laid down in the SEA's Preamble and Article 1, including the contradictions contained in these Articles. It will encourage, but not force, the joint attainment of 'European Union', whatever the content of this term. The divergence awaits future judicial clarification. However, the reinsertion of parts of Community law into the EEA, coupled with the Agreement's objective of uniform application, reflected in Articles 6 and 104(1) Draft EEA, must necessarily lead to the future interpretation of Community law being conditioned upon the EEA's interpretation. 57 The EEA's judicial mechanism therefore infringed Article 164 EEC, and, more generally, the very foundations of the Community. 58 The danger created by this mechanism for the autonomy of the Community legal order could only be aggravated by the participation of ECJ Justices in the EEA Court's deliberations. 59 Because of the two instruments' divergent objectives, the ECJ Justices, when sitting in the EEA Court, would have to apply and interpret 'the same provisions but using different approaches, methods and concepts', 60 making it very difficult, if not impossible, for them to examine in the realm of the ECJ, 'avec une pleine indépendance d'esprit', 61 questions already examined within the EEA Court. As the EEA's judicial system was in any case incompatible with the EEC Treaty, it was not necessary to enquire further into that question.
As far as the interpretation of EEA provisions by the ECJ following request by national EFTA courts was concerned, 62 this procedure was in three respects EEA Court only in so far as these addressed EEA rules corresponding to secondary Community law (as this is ranked below international agreements in the Community legal order) and only if the EEA Court's interpretation did not run counter to the Treaties, but not by interpretations concerning provisions equivalent to primary Community law (in the Community legal order, the Treaties rank above international agreements proper functioning of Article 177 EEC, the envisaged mechanism was incompatible with Community law. 66 Article 238 EEC could not permit the institution of a system conflicting with 'Article 164 EEC and, more generally, with the very foundations of the Community'; 67 this incompatibility could not be redressed through a modification of Article 238. 68
Beyond Opinion 1/76?
The question whether, and in what configuration, an independent EEA Court could be compatible with Community law, had already caused debate before the negotiations began. 69 Before unraveling the way in which the Court resolved this question, it is necessary to recall the Court's prior jurisprudence in this field, Opinion 1/76. 70 The Convention at stake in these proceedings envisaged the setting-up of a
[i]t is not feasible to establish a legal system such as that provided for in the Statute ... and at the same time escape the consequences which inevitably follow from the participation of a third State. The need to establish judicial remedies and legal procedures ... may justify the principle underlying the system adopted. 71 As divergent interpretations of the Agreement by the judiciaries could not be excluded, the Court was however compelled to emit certain reservations regarding 66 That the EC Treaties contain no advisory procedure is perfectly accurate. So is the Court's conclusion. 73 In Opinion 1/91, the Court reversed its approach. This calls for three preliminary observations: in the first place, the Court seems much less inclined than in Opinion 1/76 to interpret draft agreements with the caution suggested by their open texture or the participation of third States. 74 Second, the Court's emphasis lies on the admissibility of judicial mechanisms as such and not on their composition. 75 Third, this admissibility now depends on the Community objectives as defined in earlier parts of Opinion 1/91.
As in Opinion 1/76, the Court started by stressing the compatibility, in principle, of the creation of international tribunals with Community law, 76 but, contrary to Opinion 1/76, this proposition seemed half-hearted: 77 its principal justification stemmed from international law, under which the Community was capable of 'creating or designating' 78 such tribunals, but not from considerations inherent to Community law. 79 The EEA Court was deemed incompatible with Community law because the EEA, on the one hand, duplicated part of this law, but on the other envisaged its uniform application and interpretation in the whole territory covered by the Agreement. 'Legal homogeneity' therefore governed the interpretation both of EEA rules and of the corresponding provisions of Community law. As the EEA Court was only bound by the ECJ's prior jurisprudence, though both Courts were expected to See supra note 55. The Court's declaration of the admissibility in principle of international tribunals is, moreover explained by reference to the Community's international capacity which permits submission to international tribunals in the same way as the international capacity of sovereign states. The Community's international capacity is however limited by its objectives.
'take due account' of each other's rulings, the future development of Community law was conditioned upon its prior interpretation in a more limited context, thereby clearly infringing the autonomy of the Community legal order. Concerning the EEA, the difficulty could be solved in a straightforward manner: 80 interpretative jurisdiction had to remain exclusively with the European Court of Justice. The Court's assessment of the EEA Court's composition, closely related to the EEA's objective of partial duplication of Community law, contains an additional intriguing feature. As the Community's and the EEA's objectives are fundamentally distinct, the ECJ, even if designated as the only competent Court for the EEA's interpretation, has to retain its indépendance d'esprit 81 when dealing with Community matters. Even establishing the ECJ as the only Court capable of interpreting the EEA cannot therefore guarantee total 'legal homogeneity'.
There remained the general question of the compatibility with Community law, in principle or under certain conditions, of the institution of international tribunals in agreements concluded by the Community. The Court did not need to address this issue, but parts of the Opinion suggest that it did. The Court rejected the EEA Court's interpretative jurisdiction of the notion of 'Contracting Parties' as running counter, in particular, to Articles 164 and 219 EEC. 82 Placed in the general context of international agreements, 83 this explanation could be read in two different ways.
On the one hand, the problem of an international tribunal having to interpret the scope of the Community's competences could arise in every 'mixed' agreement, unless the agreement foresaw special mechanisms to the contrary. 84 No 'mixed' agreement could therefore foresee an international jurisdiction.
On the other hand, the Court's insistence on Articles 164 and 219 EEC 85 conferring upon it exclusive jurisdiction to safeguard the Community's autonomy can be understood as leading to even more far-reaching results: Article 164 EEC covers all provisions of primary and secondary Community law. Containing identical provisions, 86 Articles 164 and 219 EEC should have the same 80 The ECJ refrained from drawing this conclusion in the Opinion, but the EEA's negotiators did; see, e.g., McEvoy, 'EC to press on with plans for single market with EFTA 89 The Court's argumentation in recital 35 of Opinion 1/91 is not very explicit, but its insistence on the interrelation of Articles 164 and 219 EEC, in the context of its interpretation of 'mixed' international agreements, may have meant that these agreements were indeed covered by both Articles, whose reading would have had far-reaching consequences. 90 Amending Article 238 EEC could clearly not suffice to avoid these conclusions. 91 The ECJ's heavy reliance on Article 164 EEC as justification of this part of its ruling, as well as the textual ambiguity contained in recital 72 of the Opinion's French version, might however entail an additional conclusion: the Court could have discovered, in Article 164 EEC a 'higher' norm of Community law, part of the Community's very foundations. 92 The accuracy of this reading and its consequences must be left to further judicial developments. As an international agreement was, under Article 177(1)(b) EEC, an act of one of the Community's institutions, the ECJ was competent for its interpretation, be it in the context of preliminary rulings or of direct actions. If the agreement contained an independent judicial mechanism, its decisions were binding on the Community institutions, which was in principle compatible with Community law. However as the EEA duplicated parts of the Community legal order and aspired to 'legal homogeneity' in the EEA's interpretation and application, the future interpretation of Community law would be conditioned upon the interpretation of EEA rules, in a manner contrary to the Community's very foundations.
C. International Agreements in the Community

The Court's deeds
At first sight, this part of the Court's ruling seems to be concerned solely with the EEA Court's incompatibility with the Treaties, but it contains another noteworthy development, explanation of which will be undertaken by comparing the Court's words with its prior jurisprudence concerning the position of 'mixed' international agreements in the Community legal order. 94 Our starting point is Haegeman, the first ruling in which the Court addressed the position of international agreements in the Community legal order: the Agreement had been concluded by the Council under Articles 228 and 238 EEC. It was therefore, as far as the Community was concerned, an act of a Community institution in the sense of Article 177 (1)(b) The Haegeman formula can be seen as representing an 'earlier' period of the Court's jurisprudence 96 in which it seems to have pursued a double objective. On the one hand, the binding force of 'mixed' agreements in the Community legal order was limited to the Community's treaty-making power. On the other, the use of 'mixed' agreements was curtailed, the extent of Community and Member State competences being, on every occasion, precisely delimited. 97 After Opinion 1/78 had brought a shift in the Court's approach towards 'mixity', 98 the jurisprudential development at the heart of our analysis was initiated by the Court in Demirel. 99 First, the Court restated Haegeman:
It should first be pointed out that, ... an agreement concluded by the Council under Articles 228 and 238 of the Treaty is, as far as the Community is concerned, an act of one of the institutions of the Community within the meaning of Article 177(1)(b), and, as from its entry into force, the provisions of such an agreement form an integral part of the Community legal system; within the framework of that system, the Court has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation of such an agreement. 100 But the Court finally avoided the pending 'mixity' issue by interpreting Article 238 EEC as necessarily empowering the Community to enter into international commitments in all fields covered by the Treaty. 101 It was therefore immaterial that the implementing powers still lay with the Member States. 102 The next two steps were taken in Re Aid to Turkey and Sevince. 103 The first is that the Court extended the Haegeman formula to the acts of organs 104 instituted by such Grabitz, supra note 52, at paragraph 34). 96
The 'turning-point' in the Court's approach seems to have come with Opinion 1/78, supra note 53, infra note 100 and Ruling 1/78 EAEC, supra note 95, infra note 113. 97
In Opinion 1/76, supra note 70, the Member States' participation in the Agreement was found compatible with the Treaty 'solely' for the purpose of amending Treaties concluded with third countries prior to the EEC Treaty (recital 7). In Opinion 1/78, supra note 53, the Court made the 'communautaire' or 'mixed' nature of the agreement dependent on the budgetary dispositions taken for its implementation by the Community or the Member States (recital 60). 98
The Council and some Member States had raised the question whether the Court, in a procedure under the second subparagraph of Art. 228(1) EEC, was even competent to address the 'mixity'-issue. The Court seems to have responded in two ways. First, quoting all previous Opinions, as well as Ruling 1/78 EAEC, it held that it was possible under Art. 228 EEC to deal with 'all' questions concerning the envisaged agreement's compatibility with the Treaty (recital 30). The division of competences therefore was within the Court's reach. Second, the ECJ found that the whole agreement (with the exception of its financial provisions, see previous note) fell under Art. 113 EEC, various dispositions beyond the Community's competence being 'of an altogether subsidiary or ancillary nature' (recital 56). This seems to have been the first hint in the Court's jurisprudence towards the absorption of Member State competences via international agreements. 99
Supra note 95. As in Opinion 1/78, this came as a response to the Member States questioning its interpretative jurisdiction (recital 6). 100 Demirel, recital 7. 101 Demirel, recital 9. We shall return to this statement's ambiguities in IV.C.2. below. 102 Recital 11, citing Kupferberg, supra note 23. 103 Supra note 95. agreements, first in an area clearly covered by Community competences, then in matters arguably exceeding their scope. 105 It also held that provisions contained in such acts could create direct effects in the Community legal order. 106 The second and more hidden development lies in the tightening of the Haegeman formula: in Re Aid to Turkey, the Court omitted the qualification that the international agreement was only part of the Community legal order 'as far as the Community was concerned', 107 in Sevince, it deleted the restriction of the Court's jurisdiction to 'the framework of [the Community's legal] system'. 108 From Demirel to Sevince, the Court extended the Community's legal order, as well as its own interpretative latitude, to all fields covered by 'mixed' agreements.
If, according to that jurisprudence, the whole 'mixed' agreement became part of Community law, the question was bound to arise whether some 'reverse parallelism', in the ERTA 109 sense, would attribute to the Community the implementing powers corresponding to the provisions absorbed. Two outcomes were envisageable: either some sort of 'implied power' had to be assumed, 110 or another solution had to be found which could avoid that result. The Court had opted for the first alternative at least once in its earlier jurisprudence. 111 It is the second for which the Court has apparently now settled.
In Opinion 1/91, another modification of the Haegeman-Demirel-Sevince formula took place: the reference to Article 238 EEC disappeared. 112 The importance of this rephrasing is threefold: first, it establishes that the formula henceforth applies to all international agreements concluded by the Community. 113 Second, in this setting Article 228 EEC covers 'communautaire' and 'mixed' agreements alike, confirming both types' absorption by the Community legal order. Third, and most important, the problem of implementation is solved: under Kupferberg, 114 it results from the binding force of international agreements being part of the Community legal order that the Member States, by respecting commitments arising from such agreements, fulfill an obligation towards the Community under Article 228(2) EEC. This obligation can be enforced via the ECJ, under preliminary ruling procedures 115 or in direct actions, 116 whose decisions the Member States have to obey.
The direct consequence, in Opinion 1/91, of the binding force of international agreements as now defined by the Court is also far-reaching: as under international law, the Court itself is bound by the Agreement, it can be compelled to file a request for amending its Statute, under Article 188(2) EEC, although the Treaty leaves this decision to the Court's discretion. 117 
III. Intermezzo -the Renegotiation
Opinion 1/91 had been a bitter pill, but after initial dismay, the Parties renegotiated. The EEA Court's substitution by some other judicial mechanism was a delicate matter. 119 After tortuous negotiations, 120 a second compromise was reached:
The EEA Court is replaced by an EFTA Court 121 competent for the dispute-settlement between EFTA countries and the revision of ESA's decisions in competition matters.
Legal homogeneity is explicitly included into the Agreement's objectives, although in a modulated form, 122 and a special 'double-track' procedure for its implementation foreseen. Under Article 105 EEA, 123 the Joint Committee has to keep the jurisprudential evolution of ECJ and EFTA Court under constant review and, in case of divergent developments, 'act' 124 so as to preserve homogeneity. 125 If this is of no avail, the dispute-settlement procedure contained in Article 111 EEA may apply:
The Community or an EFTA State may bring any dispute concerning the Agreement's interpretation or application before the Joint Committee. If the dispute concerns EEA provisions identical in substance to corresponding EC rules, the Contracting Parties to the dispute may agree to request the ECJ to give a binding interpretation of these dispositions 126 (paragraph 3). If the scope and duration of safeguard measures or the proportionality of rebalancing measures are at stake, any Contracting Party may submit the dispute to binding arbitration. No question involving interpretation of an EEA provision identical in substance to EC rules may be dealt with in this procedure (paragraph 4).
Finally, Article 56 EEA contains the distribution of competences between ESA and Commission in the area of competition policy. 127 'Pure' EFTA cases belong to ESA, 'pure' EC cases (Articles 85 and 86 EEC) to the Commission. The cases affecting trade between CPs are shared. The Commission has competence in all cases affecting trade between EC Member States, 128 as well as in some situations involving one or more EFTA countries and one EC Member State; the remaining cases belong to ESA.
The Commission had not intended a second delay, 129 but the European Parliament, 'regretting' the limited scope of the Commission's earlier request, 130 battled for resubmission. 131 The Commission returned a limited request 132 to the Court. Limited was the Court's answer.
IV. Opinion 1/92 -the Final Curtain
In the remainder of this article, I shall concentrate upon the confirmation, modification or evolution, in Opinion 1/92, of the principles developed by the Court in Opinion 1/91.
A. The Consequences of Divergent Objectives
The Court (recitals 2, 17-29)
As the Court had held in its prior Opinion, the divergences in aims and context between EEA and Community law stood in the way of 'legal homogeneity'. 133 Since these divergences remained, the question was whether the new dispute-settlement procedure contained in Articles 105 and 111 EEA was bound to raise objections similar to those expressed in Opinion 1/91.
If Article 105 EEA empowered the Joint Committee to disregard the binding nature of the ECJ's case-law, this power would adversely affect the Community legal order, respect for which must be ensured by the ECJ under Article 164 EEC. As the principle enshrined in the Procès-verbal agréé 134 however constituted an essential safeguard, indispensable for this order's autonomy, Article 105 EEA was compatible with Community law only if that principle was laid down in a form 'binding on the Contracting Parties'. 135 The same problem arose with regard to the dispute-settlement procedure contained in Article 111 EEA, but as Article 105(3) EEA established a link between the two procedures, these had to be interpreted 'systematically and consistently', which necessarily implied that the principle contained in the Procès-verbal agréé ad Article 105 EEA had to apply to both Articles. 136 As this principle was binding on the CPs, the powers conferred upon the Joint Committee by Article 111 EEA would not endanger the EC's autonomy.
Divergence maintained, homogeneity created
On the one hand, because of the EEA's more restricted aspirations, the Joint Committee's decisions should not be allowed to jeopardize the Community's pursuance of its own more far-reaching objectives. 137 This meant preventing the Parties from 'overruling' the ECJ's Community related jurisprudence. On the other hand, even if these decisions took account of the EEA's inherent limitations, they should not compromise the ECJ's interpretative function of EEA dispositions. This meant preventing the 'overruling' of the ECJ's EEA related jurisprudence. Moreover, for the sake of preserving the unity of the Community legal order, these considerations had to be realized for all Contracting Parties, although the Court's 'partner' was the Joint Committee.
There was only one solution: tying, in all cases involving the EEA's interpretation, first the Joint Committee, then the Contracting Parties (i.e. the Member States, although they had no direct influence on the Joint Committee's decisions 138 seem to be totally persuasive 139 and appears to be principally geared towards avoiding the result reached in Opinion 1/91, 140 but the Court's concern for the EC's autonomy should be approved.
The consequence of this 'tie-in' is striking: if the CPs can in no circumstance deviate from the Court's case-law, this creates, in the areas covered by the EEA, de facto legal homogeneity, regardless of the differing objectives. The EC may deepen its own integration, while at the same time concluding agreements as comprehensive as the EEA, but integration has to prevail. Should the CPs not respect the Court's jurisprudence, there will be no EEA. 141 Contrary to Opinion 1/91, Opinion 1/92 achieves partial 142 homogeneity in spite of divergent objectives. 154 possibly confirming our hint at this Article's 'higher' position. 155 The Court's jurisdiction, extendible as it now seems, has however been limited ratione materiae. Gone are the references to Articles 164 and 219 EEC 156 and the threat of their far-reaching consequences. Besides the ECJ, the establishment of other courts is possible, as long as they do not reach the 'hard-core' of Community law. 157 C. Article 238 EEC and the Doctrine of 'Implied Powers'
B. Clarifications on Jurisdiction
Roma locuta (recitals 38-42)
Concerning Article 56 EEA, 158 it followed from the Court's case-law 159 that the Community's authority to enter into international agreements arose not only from express attribution by the Treaty, but also from other Treaty provisions and measures taken pursuant to these provisions by the institutions. The Community was therefore empowered, under the EEC competition rules and measures implementing those rules, to conclude international agreements in this field.
[T]hat power necessarily implies that the Community may accept rules made by virtue of an agreement as to the sharing of the respective competences of the Contracting Parties in the field of competition, provided that those rules do not change the nature of the powers of the Community and of its institutions as conceived in the Treaty. 160 Article 56 EEA was therefore compatible with Community law.
Demirel à l'envers
The doctrine of 'implied powers' 161 in the Community's external relations, created progressively by the Court in ERTA, Kramer and Opinion 1/76, 162 states that in the absence of express external powers (Article 113 or Article 238 EEC 163 ), the Community's authority to enter into international agreements may flow implicitly from other Treaty provisions and measures adopted on their basis by the Community institutions.
[W]henever Community law has created for the institutions of the Community powers within its internal system for attaining a specific objective, the Community has authority to enter into the international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence of an express provision in that connection. 164 The doctrine's applicability therefore depends on two conditions: there has to be an internal competence covering the envisaged agreement, 165 and international action has to be necessary 166 for the attainment of an internal Community objective. 167 If both conditions are fulfilled, the external competence, once exercised, is exclusive. 168 Applying this doctrine to the EEA's division of competences in competition matters is problematic. First, the Community's internal competence does not cover the powers envisaged by the Agreement 169 and cannot be extended via 'necessity' or 'efficiency' arguments 170 because the Community's internal competition policy can be implemented without international agreements. 171 Second, according to the ECJ's settled case-law, 172 the Community's internal jurisdiction in competition matters is necessarily concurrent to that of the Member States.
Finally, the EEA is based on an explicit Community competence, Article 238 EEC. In this respect, the ECJ's prior decision, Demirel, 173 attains specific significance: 174 [S]ince the agreement in question is [1.] an association agreement [2.] creating special, privileged links with a non-member country, [3.] which must, at least to a certain extent, take part in the Community system, Article 238 must necessarily empower the Community to guarantee commitments ... in all fields covered by the Treaty. 175 The Demirel criteria being fulfilled in the case of the EEA, Article 238 EEC should have been a sufficient basis for Article 56 EEA, but essential factors distinguish Opinion 1/92 from Demirel. In Demirel, through the Agreement's conclusion by the Community, some Member State competences had become an integral part of the Community legal order; this was recognized by the ECJ ex post facto, in an area where implementation still lay with the Member States. In Opinion 1/92, the Court's reasoning sounds like an ex ante justification for the attribution, via international agreement, of regulatory powers to an institution whose powers stem from the yet unconcluded Agreement.
Two explanations are possible. Both confirm our reading of Opinion 1/91: 176 on the one hand, the Court may have revolutionized the doctrine of 'implied powers' for the sake of 'expansion'. 177 This hypothesis must be left to future judicial confirmation.
Opinion 1/92, on the other hand, may have modified the doctrine of 'implied powers' in a more limited way. Clarifying its scope, 178 the Court may have relied on the doctrine's second component, the 'necessary and proper' clause, 179 for delegating, to the Commission, implementing powers 180 necessary for the EEA's realization. 181 This reading can be substantiated textually: the Community is empowered to accept the sharing 182 of competences between CPs, provided the nature of the powers of the Community (concurrent) and of its institutions (in casu, Commission -implementing, and ECJ -supervising) remain unaffected.
V. Epilogue
This note has attempted, by giving an overview of the antecedents, negotiating history and successive structures of the EEA Agreement and exposing the technical intricacies of the two Opinions related to this Agreement, to show the general importance of these Opinions for the development of the Community legal order.
In the first place, the attainment of European Union may or may not have been established as a Community obligation, but its importance as a Community objective has been affirmed. This does not prevent the Community from concluding comprehensive, legally binding international arrangements, but the Community's autonomy and originality must be guaranteed.
Secondly, the conflict between the Court of Justice's comprehensive jurisdiction inside the Community and the latter's participation in international judicial mechanisms has, after initial hesitations, been solved in a satisfactory manner. The ECJ is still competent for the interpretation of international agreements in their entirety, but this does not exclude jurisdiction by international tribunals, as long as the Community's legal 'hard core' -primary and secondary Community law and international dispositions identical to its substance -remains the Court's prerogative.
Finally, the Community has been attributed the indispensable instruments for becoming a powerful actor in the international arena. 'Mixity' as a distinct legal category has practically faded. Additionally, the Community has been empowered to accept implementing responsibilities exceeding its internal capacities, if these are necessary for the attainment of its international aspirations.
In some of these fields, 'higher' levels of primary Community law may be evolving, possibly laying the bases for a future verfassungsrechtliche Grund-ordnung. The 'Drama' of the EEA thus found a positive solution, at least for the Community. For EFTA countries, on the contrary, it painfully revealed the frustrating dichotomy between an important actor and a powerless audience, condemned to passivity.
